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A Rule of Persons, Not Machines:
The Limits of Legal Automation
Frank Pasquale*
For many legal futurists, attorneys’ work is a prime target for automation.
They view the legal practice of most businesses as algorithmic: data (such as
facts) are transformed into outputs (agreements or litigation stances) via
application of set rules. These technophiles promote substituting computer
code for contracts and descriptions of facts now written by humans. They
point to early successes in legal automation as proof of concept. TurboTax
has helped millions of Americans file taxes, and algorithms have taken over
certain aspects of stock trading. Corporate efforts to “formalize legal code”
may bring new efficiencies in areas of practice characterized by both legal
and factual clarity.
However, legal automation can also elide or exclude important human values,
necessary improvisations, and irreducibly deliberative governance. Due
process, appeals, and narratively intelligible explanation from persons, for
persons, depend on forms of communication that are not reducible to
software. Language is constitutive of these aspects of law. To preserve
accountability and a humane legal order, these reasons must be expressed in
language by a responsible person. This basic requirement for legitimacy
limits legal automation in several contexts, including corporate compliance,
property recordation, and contracting. A robust and ethical legal profession
respects the flexibility and subtlety of legal language as a prerequisite for a
just and accountable social order. It ensures a rule of persons, not machines.
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Introduction
Will law become a subdivision of computer science? The idea might
seem far-fetched now, given attorneys’ distinctive professional role as
crafters and maintainers of social order. However, the history of the
professions is one of jurisdictional turf battles, as rival elites claim the right
to solve certain problems, or fill certain social roles.1 More recently, the
spread of automation to white-collar work has prompted futurists to predict
that artificial intelligence will complete many tasks now performed by
lawyers—or replace them entirely.2
There are some realms of legal practice where algorithms—a building
block of artificial intelligence—have already displaced legal workers.
Automated document review is a staple of discovery now. A worker is far
more likely to use TurboTax than to visit a lawyer or accountant to prepare
annual returns for the Internal Revenue Service. Lawmakers could eventually
draft tax statutes in the form of computer code, eliminating the interpretative
step that TurboTax’s lawyers and engineers must take as they translate
statutory requirements into their software.3
However, both lawmakers and regulators should be cautious as they
attempt to code legal obligations into software. While computer code and
human language both enable forms of communication, the affordances
offered by each are distinct and, in many respects, mutually exclusive. Code
seeks to eliminate the forms of ambiguity and flexibility characteristic of
much language, including legal language.4 Just as quests to replace all
standards with rules have failed, so too will most efforts to rewrite legal rules
as code.
To be sure, technology is already assisting civil lawyers in their
traditional roles as advocates and advisors, and will continue to do so in the
1

ANDREW ABBOTT, THE SYSTEM OF PROFESSIONS: AN ESSAY ON THE DIVISION OF EXPERT
LABOR (2014).
2
Frank Pasquale and Glyn Cashwell, Four Futures of Legal Automation, 63 U.C.L.A. L.
REV. DISC. 26, 28 (2015); Frank Pasquale & Glyn Cashwell, Prediction, Persuasion, and the
Jurisprudence of Behaviorism, U. TORONTO L. REV. (forthcoming, 2018).
3
Sarah B. Lawsky, Formalizing the Code, 70 TAX L. REV. 377, 379 (2017).
4
DAVID GOLUMBIA, THE CULTURAL LOGIC OF COMPUTATION 78 (2009).
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future.5 But can it replace them entirely? For many futurists, who project
industrial trends onto the profession of law, the answer is a resounding yes.6
Legal futurists predict that software will not only help lawyers find the cases
relevant to their briefs, but write the briefs themselves.7 Some predict a “legal
singularity,” which will “arrive when the accumulation of massively more
data and dramatically improved methods of inference make legal uncertainty
obsolete.”8 For many journalists, the arguments are compelling, and support
a surfeit of stories on the “end of lawyers” and the “death of Big Law.”9
Legal futurists build on the work of legal software vendors, who tend
to dismiss ordinary practice as riddled with inefficiency (in order to market
their wares as far better by comparison).10 Both groups prescribe the
automation of legal services as a way to advance access to justice, reduce
legal costs, and promote the rule of law.11 Legal futurists characterize these
developments as a democratization of law and an empowerment of ordinary
individuals.12 They tap into both conservative, pro-market rhetoric against
the professions, and left-wing distrust of elites.13 Nor is legal futurism

5

This article focuses on the role of technology in civil legal practice, because calls for the
technological displacement of legal work in the criminal context have been far more muted
than they are in the civil space. For critical perspectives on substitutive automation of
criminal law enforcement personnel, see Elizabeth E. Joh, Policing Police Robots, 64 UCLA
L. REV. DISC. 516 (2016); Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Big Data and Predictive Reasonable
Suspicion, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 327, 350 (2015).
6
John O. McGinnis & Russell G. Pearce, The Great Disruption: How Machine Intelligence
Will Transform the Role of Lawyers in the Delivery of Legal Services, 82 FORDHAM L. REV.
3041, 3041–42 (2014).
7
RICHARD SUSSKIND & DANIEL SUSSKIND, THE FUTURE OF THE PROFESSIONS 202 (2015)
(describing computerized drafting of legal and other documents).
8
Benjamin Alarie, The Path of the Law: Towards Legal Singularity, 66 U. TORONTO L.J.
443 (2016); Benjamin Alarie et al., Law in the Future, 66 U. TORONTO L.J. 423 (2016).
9
See, e.g., Tom Meltzer, Robot Doctors, Online Lawyers and Automated Architects: the
Future of the Professions?, THE GUARDIAN (June 15, 2014).
10
Bruce H. Kobayashi & Larry E. Ribstein, Law’s Information Revolution, 53 ARIZ. L. REV.
1169, 1170 (2012) (promoting disruption of so-called legacy providers of legal services by
information-technology-intensive corporations).
11
SUSSKIND & SUSSKIND, supra note 7, at 66–67.
12
Daniel Martin Katz, Quantitative Legal Prediction, 62 EMORY L.J. 909, 939–41 (2013).
13
For conservative rhetoric, see, e.g., John O. McGinnis, Machines vs. Lawyers, CITY J.,
Spring, 2014, http://www.city-journal.org/2014/24_2_machines-vs-lawyers.html (claiming
that the “innovators driving our computational revolution . . . [are] likely to shape a politics
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presented as merely one more dictate of an increasingly competitive market.
Rather, it is praised as normatively desirable, a “new form of law” that “will
emerge to provide all of the benefits of both rules and standards without the
costs of either.”14
Legal futurists tend to present the reduction of legal obligations to
computer code as a positive evolutionary step toward the realization of the
rule of law.15 Human attorneys can err about facts or misrepresent past
precedent; human judges may be influenced by extraneous factors or bias.16
Thus automators of law tend to see their work as one more step toward
elevating the legal system above the fallibility of any particular person within
it.17 One literal way of achieving the oft-quoted ideal “a rule of law, not of
men” is to dispense altogether with persons implementing or interpreting
law.18 For example, an unappealable fine imposed by a red light camera, and
automatically deducted from a motorist’s bank account, would amount to
pure automation of law, unaffected by any particular policeman’s or judge’s
bias.
Of course, this approach merely shifts personal responsibility from
attorneys, regulators, and judges, to those coding their would-be
replacements. Until some “master algorithm” can code its own progeny,
more friendly to markets.”). For left-wing suspicion of professionals as elites, see MAGALI
SARFATTI LARSON, THE RISE OF PROFESSIONALISM: A SOCIOLOGICAL ANALYSIS (1977).
14
Anthony J. Casey & Anthony Niblett, The Death of Rules and Standards, University of
Chicago Coase-Sandor Institute for Law & Economics Research Paper No. 738 (2015), at 1,
available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2693826.
15
Anthony D'Amato, Can/Should Computers Replace Judges?, 11 GA. L. REV. 1277, 1300
(1977) (presenting computerization as a path to a more “determinable legal system.”).
16
See, e.g., Ozkan Eren & Naci Mocan, Emotional Judges and Unlucky Juveniles (NBER
Working Paper No. 22611, 2016) (finding that unexpected losses in football games “played
by a prominent college team in the state . . . increase disposition (sentence) lengths assigned
by judges during the week following the game”). I discuss how sophisticated legal systems
should address these kinds of biases in Part III.B., infra.
17
J.C. Smith, Machine Intelligence and Legal Reasoning - The Charles Green Lecture in
Law and Technology, 73 CHI.-KENT. L. REV. 277 (1998) (“From the perspective of the
lawyer, we have the concept of the rule of law, as contrasted with the rule of persons; thus,
in some sense separating the legal conceptual process from the human.”).
18
Margaret Jane Radin explains that “The ideal of ‘the rule of law, not of men’ calls upon us
to strive to ensure that our law itself will rule (govern) us, not the wishes of powerful
individuals.” Radin, Reconsidering the Rule of Law, 69 B.U. L. REV. 781, 781 (1989).
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human beings will always be responsible for legal determinations.19 In order
for legal automation to truly respect rule of law principles, the adage “a rule
of law, not of men” thus must be complemented by a new commitment—to
a “rule of persons, not machines.”20 Without attributing algorithmic
judgments and interpretations to particular persons, and holding them
responsible for explaining those judgments, legal automation will deflect and
defeat basic principles of accountability.
This article describes how language is often constitutive of law and
legal judgments—not merely one of many forms they can take, but the only
form capable of realizing foundational rule of law principles. Recognition of
this power of language should guide the future of legal automation. This
recognition also balances the emerging discourse of legal futurists, by
articulating what is lost when society cedes more aspects of the authoritative
articulation of rights and duties to computational processes.
Substitutive legal automation is designed to replace, rather than
merely aid, attorneys.21 Part I explores three areas where substitutive legal
automation has become widespread: software now prepares millions of
Americans’ taxes, firms like LegalZoom draft wills and contracts based on
computerized interactions with customers, and chatbots like DoNotPay guide
users through challenges to parking tickets. Each of these legal technologies
democratizes access to information. However, they can also mislead users
about their rights and duties, while foreclosing opportunities for

19

The leading academic treatment of the possibility of such automation is found in PEDRO
DOMINGOS, THE MASTER ALGORITHM 12–20 (2015) (discussing how integration of five
schools of machine learning may lead to rapid advances in computing).
20
My shift from “men” to “persons” here reflects Radin’s rationale for making a similar
move in her classic article on the rule of law: “For obvious reasons, because I am considering
the Rule of Law in today’s context, I shall rephrase the ideal as ‘the rule of law, not of
individuals.’ Yet we must not forget that when the ideal developed, and during most of its
long history, it was inconceivable that any individuals who were not ‘men’ could be a part
of political life.” Radin, supra note 18, at 781 n.1.
21
This is to be contrasted with complementary legal automation, like search engines or word
processing software, which assists attorneys. WILLIAM J. BAUMOL & ALAN S. BLINDER,
ECONOMICS: PRINCIPLES AND POLICY 120 (13th ed. 2015) (describing complements and
substitutes as fundamental economic categories to indicate the effect of one good or service
on the value of others).
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compensation for this harm, via restrictive terms of service. The language of
law is both richer and more treacherous than these simple programs present.
Despite these and similar problems with current, modest efforts to
substitute technology for attorneys, both computer scientists and legal
scholars have promoted even more ambitious programs of substitutive
automation. Part II describes three of these initiatives, and their
shortcomings. In each case, legal problems that appear at first merely to
require a simple translation of language into computer code, turn out to hinge
on far more complex social and political relationships. The flexibility and
openness of language enables the type of improvisation necessary to
maintain those relationships. Nevertheless, many legal futurists still promote
a vision of self-executing law, embedded in code, as the ultimate goal of legal
technology.
Part III proposes an alternate approach: technology as tool to
complement attorneys’ skills, rather than substitute for them. Drawing on the
distinction between artificial intelligence and intelligence augmentation
common in research on human-computer interaction, it promotes principles
for complementary (rather than substitutive) legal automation. A
complementary approach not only promises to serve clients better, but also
to more fully realize rule of law values.
Law is a complex and variegated domain, including services ranging
from the humblest administrative processes to the highest stakes of
imprisonment and freedom. So it should come as no surprise that the use of
software and robots to draft, interpret, and enforce laws has varying degrees
of plausibility, depending on the context. Obtaining a fishing license with a
chatbot makes sense—and we should see more and better examples of such
“civic tech” in coming years.22 On the other hand, even the most enthusiastic
boosters of legal automation do not want to see prison sentences handed down
by robot judges or juries. More difficult questions arise between these two
extremes, to which we shall now turn.
22

Civic tech can be defined as the use of technology by governments to promote positive
interactions among citizens themselves, and between citizens and their state. Michael
Halberstam, Beyond Transparency: Rethinking Election Reform from an Open Government
Perspective, 38 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1007, 1009 (2015); MAYUR PATEL ET AL., THE
EMERGENCE OF CIVIC TECH: INVESTMENTS IN A GROWING FIELD (2013).
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I. CURRENT APPLICATIONS OF SUBSTITUTIVE LEGAL TECHNOLOGY
The most promising versions of legal automation are targeted at
people who need and deserve—but cannot afford—an attorney. For example,
in many low-income neighborhoods, thousands of children have juvenile
records for crimes like selling marijuana or vandalism.23 States recognize that
the resulting records should not hound persons after they become adults, and
all have adopted some version of a process called expungement to seal such
records.24 Attorneys can usually arrange for an expungement relatively
quickly—but not everyone has access to a lawyer. Therefore, public interest
attorneys and technologists have developed apps like Expunge|Maryland
(designed for Maryland residents) to automate much of the process of seeking
a simple expungement.25
These apps fill a gap in the legal services market. In general, the
worse a job is done presently, the better a robot looks in comparison. For the
average American citizen, quotidian interactions with legal authorities can
range from the annoying to the cringe-inducing. Car registration, income tax
calculation, application for financial aid—each can easily descend into
confusing labyrinths of texts, punctuated with unsatisfactory interactions
with rude and overworked bureaucrats. Software and app makers are now
trying to ease that burden with innovative approaches to serving customers.
However, each of these interventions has unexpected consequences which
mitigate their value.
A. Automating Tax Preparation

23

Michael Pinard, Criminal Records, Race and Redemption, 16 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB.
POL’Y 963, 968 (2013); Lahny R. Silva, Clean Slate: Expanding Expungements and Pardons
for Non-Violent Federal Offenders, 79 U. CIN. L. REV. 155 (2010).
24
Amy Shlosberg et al., Expungement and Post-Exoneration Offending, 104 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 353 (2014)
25
See Tyler Waldman, Why ExpungeMaryland.org is Helping People Erase Their Criminal
Records, TECHNICAL.LY: BALTIMORE (July 25, 2014), http://technical.ly/baltimore/
2014/07/25/expungemaryland-expunge-erase-criminal-records-baltimore/. On its website,
the service is currently billed as an “expungement paralegal,” not an expungement lawyer.
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At tax time, Americans have long used software programs to calculate
their income tax liability. TurboTax was established in the 1980s, and has
become ever more dominant in the past few decades.26 The U.S. Internal
Revenue Code is over 72,000 words; the agency administering it (the IRS)
can generate hundreds or thousands of words of instructions for filling out
single lines of return forms.27 TurboTax translates the welter of tax law into
a series of questions. For users with simple returns, the software is strikingly
easy to use. For those with more complex ones, it can be more trying—but is
almost certainly easier to use than trying to figure out one’s liability alone.
TurboTax has saved U.S. taxpayers countless hours in tax preparation
time. For its customers, the days of filling out tax forms with paper and pencil
are over.28 However, the company’s success is not an entirely positive story.
And it provides some early warning signs as we see other forms of legal
automation entering the limelight.
First, for most citizens, tax returns are simple. One of America’s
leading tax experts, William Gale, has estimated that the government could
easily calculate the tax due from “non-itemizers” (that is, people who take a
standard deduction, rather than specifically claiming expenditures like a
mortgage interest deduction or moving expenses).29 The IRS could base its

26

TurboTax became available in the mid-80s to businesses and individuals. See Richard P.
Weber, TurboTax, J. AM. TAX ASS’N (Spring 1986) (reviewing the software).
27
JEFFREY A. WINTERS, OLIGARCHY 223 (2011) (describing the complexity of the code as
an outgrowth of interest group politics).
28
Filing Season Statistics for Week Ending, IRS (Dec. 25, 2015) https://www.irs.gov/
uac/newsroom/filing-season-statistics-for-week-ending-december-25-2015 (IRS stats only
show the breakdown for e-filed returns, which constitute 85.5% of returns. Of those, in 2015,
39% were self-prepared, 61% prepared by tax professionals. Of the paper returns submitted,
there is no information about how many of those were generated by software.).
29
William G. Gale, Remove the Return, in TOWARD TAX REFORM: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR
PRESIDENT OBAMA’S TASK FORCE 41 (2009) (estimating that 60 million filers could use this
method); Austan Goolsbee, The Simple Return: Reducing America’s Tax Burden Through
Return-Free Filing, BROOKINGS INSTITUTION DISCUSSION PAPER (July 2006),
http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2006/07/useconomics-goolsbee; Liz Day, How
the Maker of TurboTax Fought Simple Free Filing, PROPUBLICA (updated Apr. 14, 2016),
https://www.propublica.org/article/how-the-maker-of-turbotax-fought-free-simple-taxfiling (“Advocates say tens of millions of taxpayers could use such a system each year, saving
them a collective $2 billion and 225 million hours in prep costs and time, according to one
estimate.”).
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annual bill on information already provided to it by employers—and give
individuals the choice to either accept that tax, or try filing their own returns.
Gale and other advocates pressed the IRS to offer this option to nonitemizers.30 Sensing a threat to its business model, TurboTax fought back.31
It spent millions of dollars to lobby against the proposal, even stirring up socalled “grassroots” opposition via a public relations firm.32 The legal
automators beat back the proposal, demonstrating that high technology firms
can have a vested interest in keeping things complicated enough to assure
steady demand for their services.
The mere availability of software like TurboTax may have other,
troubling effects on legislators. According to Lawrence Zelenak, when tax
returns were primarily done on paper, Congress “did not impose income tax
provisions of great computational complexity on large numbers of taxpayers,
in the belief that it was unreasonable to require average taxpayers (or their
paid preparers) to struggle with” such details.33 Zelenak argues that tax return
preparation software eliminated that “complexity constraint,” freeing
legislators to impose ever more baroque provisions. Interacting provisions
governing credits, deductions, exclusions, and the alternative minimum tax
make the resulting income tax a “black box” for many of those using
software—and nearly impossible to figure out for those who want to continue
with manual preparation.34 That evolution might be a positive one if legal
complexity clearly served positive social goals. But for Zelenak, the opposite

30

See Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105206, sec. 2004, 112 Stat. 685, 726 (requiring the Secretary of the Treasury to “develop
procedures for the implementation of a return-free tax system” by 2008); Gale, supra note
29, at 43.
31
Day, supra note 29.
32
Liz Day, TurboTax Maker Linked to ‘Grassroots’ Campaign Against Simple, Free Tax
Filing, PROPUBLICA (Apr. 14, 2014), https://www.propublica.org/article/turbotax-makerlinked-to-grassroots-campaign-against-free-simple-tax-filing.
33
Lawrence Zelenak, Complex Tax Legislation in the TurboTax Era, 1 COLUM. J. TAX L. 91,
92 (2010).
34
Id. at 93 (“As return preparation software gradually replaced the pencil in recent decades,
the complexity constraint weakened and eventually disappeared. Congress has responded by
imposing unprecedented computational complexity on large numbers of taxpayers.”).
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is the case: he believes the computationally complex provisions of the tax
code “generally constitute bad tax policy.”35
Both TurboTax’s lobbying, and the rise of computational complexity
in the tax code, embody an enduring problem in automation. Technologists
cannot assume that computational solutions to one problem will not affect the
scope and nature of that problem. Instead, as technology enters fields,
problems change, as various parties seek to either entrench or disrupt aspects
of the present situation for their own advantage. In the two examples above,
the legal automation firm (TurboTax) helped entrench unnecessary returns,
while the government made already complex tax preparation even more
difficult. While TurboTax portrays itself as the taxpayer’s inexpensive,
efficient, robotic advocate, it is also serving those in government who wish
to complicate the tax code.
B. Providing Forms
Founded in 2001, LegalZoom leads the field in providing
personalized legal forms.36 By 2011, LegalZoom claimed to have served over
2 million individuals with downloadable forms and internet-mediated walkthroughs of questionnaires and flow charts related to their legal problems.37
LegalZoom does not claim to be offering a lawyer to its users; rather, it claims
to be offering “legal information” as a sophisticated series of forms and
queries.38

35

Id. at 93.
LegalZoom.com, Inc., Amendment No. 1 to Registration Statement (Form S-1) 1 (June 4,
2012), at http://perma.cc/XAL5-WUVS.
37
Lauren Moxley, Zooming Past the Monopoly: A Consumer Rights Approach to Reforming
the Lawyer’s Monopoly and Improving Access to Justice, 9 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 553
(2015); LegalZoom, http://perma.cc/FZJ7-DV53; see also Catherine J. Lanctot, Does
Legalzoom Have First Amendment Rights: Some Thoughts About Freedom of Speech and
the Unauthorized Practice of Law, 20 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 255, 257 (2011).
38
See Moxley, supra note 37, at 554 (“LegalZoom is able to keep costs low by producing
much of its work through automated generation and review by nonlawyers….[I]t
characterizes its services as the dissemination of ‘legal information,’ which non-lawyers are
permitted to do, as opposed to the dispensation of ‘legal advice,’ which would constitute the
unauthorized practice of law (‘UPL’)”) (footnotes omitted).
36
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The firm has been popular, particularly for those looking to set up
companies. The paperwork can be complex, and LegalZoom condenses what
could be a lengthy series of meetings with attorneys into a three step process.
First, the program asks users to answer a series of questions. Then,
LegalZoom employees review answers for “consistency and completeness.”
Once these workers have approved the answers given, the program prints the
form and sends it to the user—along with instructions on how to execute the
necessary formalities for the document to have legal effect.
Whatever the qualifications of these scriveners, the questionnaire
process itself can be partial or problematic.39 As of 2015, one could go
through the questionnaire process without any prompting about the special
complexities raised by the savings vehicle where most middle class
Americans’ non-home assets are—employer-sponsored retirement savings
account.40 It turns out that, in many cases, a will does not control the
distribution of those assets at their owner’s death; rather, that’s the job of a
document memorializing the account owner’s designation of beneficiaries.
This is not merely a speculative concern. As the Wall Street Journal has
reported, some family members are surprised by the ultimate disposition of
assets from 401(k) plans and individual retirement accounts (IRAs). “That’s
where most of the wealth in America ends up,” said a certified public
accountant, “but what most people don't realize is it's surrounded by this

39

There is also widespread concern that LegalZoom, a leading form provider, engages in the
unauthorized practice of law. Wendy S. Goffe & Rochelle Heller, From Zoom to Doom?
Risks of Do-it-yourself Estate Planning, ESTATE PLANNING, Aug. 2011, at 27; Pierce G.
Hunter, Driving Legal Business Without a License, LegalZoom, Inc., and Campbell v.
Asbury Automotive, Inc., 2011 Ark. 157, 381 S.W.3d 21, 36 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV.
201 (2014); Assurance of Discontinuance, In re LegalZoom.com Inc., No. 10-2-02053-2
(Wash. Super. Ct. Sept. 15, 2010) (mandating “assurance of discontinuance” of suspect
activities); Janson v. LegalZoom 802 F. Supp. 2d 1053, 1063 (W.D. Mo. 2011);
LegalZoom.com, Inc. v. N.C. State Bar, No. 11 CVS 15111, 2014 WL 1213242 (Super. Ct.
Mar. 24, 2014); but see Medlock v. LegalZoom.Com, Inc., No. 2012-208067, 2013 S.C.
LEXIS 362, *16 (S.C. Oct. 18, 2013).
40
Screenshots on file with author. For documentation of prevalence of retirement accounts,
see Carolyn T. Geer, Family Feuds: The Battles over Retirement Accounts, WALL ST. J.
(Sept. 7, 2011) (“IRAs and 401(k)s now account for roughly 60% of the assets of U.S.
households with at least $100,000 to invest.”).
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complex labyrinth of rules.”41 Thus, “key questions are not asked, people
make mistakes, and many times it involves their life savings.”42
Presumably once this issue is brought to the attention of a bureaucrat
at a high enough level within LegalZoom, the software will be amended to
reflect the important role of beneficiary forms. The firm cultivates user
forums in order to ventilate such concerns. The work of these forums is
controversial. Internet boosters like Clay Shirky characterize them as a form
of charity, or a new form of community building. 43 Others call forum
commenting a form of “shadow work” creeping in to the experience of those
who answer questions, and a degradation of quality of service for those who,
lacking real experience of a qualified accountant or tax lawyer, may have no
sense of what they are missing.44
Business experts offer plans on how to psychologically reward
contributors (since investors are wary of any fixed labor costs).
“Gamification” is one easy answer—offering answerers points and publicly
posting their ranking relative to other would-be helpers.45 For Amazon’s top
reviewers, the system has brought microcelebrity status.46 For others, the
rewards are less clear. But what should be obvious is the shifting role of AI
in these scenarios. TurboTax or LegalZoom forums are very often not
answering tough legal questions. Rather, the key automation technology here
is a form of management which uses marketing and other tactics to draw
individuals to offer their “expertise” for free—and to encourage users to rely
on such “expertise” with no assurance it is correct.
C. Contesting Parking Tickets

41

Id.
Id.
43
CLAY SHIRKY, COGNITIVE SURPLUS (2010).
44
CRAIG LAMBERT, SHADOW WORK: THE UNPAID, UNSEEN JOBS THAT FILL YOUR DAY
(2016).
45
KEVIN WERBACH AND DAN HUNTER, FOR THE WIN HOW GAME THINKING CAN
REVOLUTIONIZE YOUR BUSINESS 2 (2012).
46
JOSEPH M. REAGLE, READING THE COMMENTS: LIKERS, HATERS, AND MANIPULATORS AT
THE BOTTOM OF THE WEB 57 (2015) (describing “super-reviewer” Grady Harp).
42
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Red light cameras are a widely implemented version of robotic law
enforcement. All that is necessary for the robot to enforce traffic law is a
simple set of rules declaring that any person who owns a car that passes under
a light when it is red shall be fined a certain amount, and/or lose their license
to operate the car.47 What if the owner wasn’t actually driving? Add in a facial
recognition subroutine, and better resolution video cameras connected to the
red light camera. Advocates of robotic law enforcement envision even finer
grained systems of social control embedded, ambiently, into roads,
sidewalks, and other features of daily life.48
Nevertheless, these steps toward the automation of traffic law merit
some skepticism. Consider, for example, the verification of medical
emergencies in the case of the parking ticket appeal app. If the city simply
accepts any appeal, bad actors are certain to take advantage of the app
eventually. Parking authorities can order audits. In some areas, like health
care fraud, big data and predictive analytics has made it much easier to expose
cheaters.49 But the auditing process seems to rely upon some form of human
interaction and expertise.
For hard-core legal futurists, though, even audits could be automated.
It is all a matter of piggybacking new technical systems on old patterns of
monitoring and data exchange. Many states already require versions of
computerized physician order entry (CPOE); digital health records have
become widespread.50 Any given visit to a doctor may generate a unique visit
47

Andrea M. Franklin, Police Powers for Sale: Red-Light Enforcement Sold to the Foreign
Bidder, 8 FLA. INT’L U. L. REV. 125 (2012); William D. Mercer, At the Intersection of
Sovereignty and Contract: Traffic Cameras and the Privatization of Law Enforcement
Power, 43 U. MEM. L. REV. 379 (2012); Jeffrey A. Parness, Beyond Red Light Enforcement
Against the Guilty but Innocent: Local Regulations of Secondary Culprits, 47 WILLAMETTE
L. REV. 259 (2011).
48
Mireille Hildebrandt, A Vision of Ambient Law, in REGULATING TECHNOLOGIES: LEGAL
FUTURES, REGULATORY FRAMES AND TECHNOLOGICAL FIXES 187 (Roger Brownsword &
Karen Yeung, eds., 2008) (describing pervasive monitoring and regulation via landscapes
and buildings saturated with sensors, processors, and actuators).
49
FRANK PASQUALE, THE BLACK BOX SOCIETY: THE SECRET ALGORITHMS THAT CONTROL
MONEY AND INFORMATION 150–53 (2015); Frank Pasquale, Private Deputies and Certifiers
in American Health Law, 92 N.C.L. REV. 1661, 1676 (2014).
50
Frank Pasquale, Private Certifiers and Deputies in American Health Care, 92 N.C. L. REV.
1661, 1665 (2014) (mentioning big data methods at HHS).
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identifier or time-stamped barcode that could, in turn, be deployed as
verification in any number of scenarios: an excuse from work, or a parking
emergency, or a claim for insurance. So the scope and intensity of automation
crucially depends on coordination among healthcare providers, employers,
insurers, and many other entities in developing machine readable, verifiable
records of behavior that has some legal import.
Moreover, even a technical innovation as pedestrian as the red light
camera has sparked both constitutional and legal challenges. For example,
Joel Christensen has argued that the cameras violate fundamental
constitutional principles of due process and the right of defendants to
confront their accusers.51 These challenges have, so far, largely failed in
courts that are eager to accelerate the resolution of what they perceive to be
relatively minor disputes. Nevertheless, public outrage about red light
cameras has reversed their advance; there are now less red light cameras in
use today than there were in 2010.52
Is this outrage justifiable? For some civil rights advocates, the answer
is a resounding no. Studies indicate that camera driven enforcement is less
likely to be racially biased than traffic stops by police officers.53 But there is
also ample evidence that algorithmic processes of sentencing and riskassessment can be racially biased.54 Automation like red light cameras has
been characterized as a troubling form of state power—an unstoppable
machine arrayed against ordinary citizens.55 However, for many believers in
51

Joel Christensen, Wrong on Red: The Constitutional Case Against Red-Light Cameras, 32
J.L. & POL’Y 443 (2010).
52
Charles Lane, Red Light Camera Use Declines After Public Outrage, ALL THINGS
CONSIDERED (NPR, May 23, 2016), http://www.npr.org/2016/05/23/479207945/red-lightcamera-use-declines-after-public-outrage.
53
Robert J. Eger et al., The Policy of Enforcement: Red Light Cameras and Racial Profiling,
18 POLICE Q. 397 (2015); Anupam Chander, The Racist Algorithm?, 115 MICH. L. REV. 1023
(2017).
54
Sonja Starr, Evidence-Based Sentencing and the Scientific Rationalization of
Discrimination, 66 STAN. L. REV. 803 (2014); Julia Angwin et al., Machine Bias,
PROPUBLICA (May 23, 2016), https://www.propublica.org/article/machine-bias-riskassessments-in-criminal-sentencing (work on risk assessment algorithm).
55
See Jathan Sadowski & Frank Pasquale, The Spectrum of Control: A Social Theory of the
Smart City, 20 FIRST MONDAY 5 (July 6, 2015); Frank Pasquale, Paradoxes of Privacy in an
Era of Asymmetrical Social Control, in BIG DATA, CRIME, AND SOCIAL CONTROL (Aleš
Završnik, ed., 2018).
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the power of technology, the answer to problems caused by technology is
simple: more technology. If the city automates traffic enforcement, then give
citizens an application (“app”) for their smartphones to empower a quick and
effective challenge when they have been unfairly fined.
A chatbot developer claims that his technology has successfully
appealed 160,000 parking tickets (out of about 225,000 cases where the app
was used).56 The DoNotPay app guides individuals through potential appeals
of parking tickets.57 For drivers in New York, the app suggests that a medical
emergency can exempt a car owner from a parking ticket. If a similar
exemption governs red lights, when there are no other automobiles in sight,
we can envision not merely the robotization of aspects of traffic and parking
law, but also the complementary automation of appeals against them.
The automation of such appeals is in its early stages. It could lead to
the same dynamics now afflicting tax: a technology-enabled turn toward
complexity and micro-enforcement. The more widely known apps like
DoNotPay become, the more likely bad actors are to deploy it to lie about the
actual circumstances of their ticketing. That will, in turn, motivate even more
pervasive surveillance of city streets to monitor the exact situation ticketed in
any given case. Municipalities are already automating many services; they
may replace so-called “meter maids” with robotics and internet of things
(IOT) sensors that tend toward perfect enforcement of the law.58
Citizens may be lulled into accepting such a state of affairs by
assuming that the same technological advances that aid law enforcement, will
also help them combat unfair or unwise applications of laws. Many
56

Samuel Gibbs, Chatbot Lawyer Overturns 160,000 Parking Tickets in London and New
York, THE GUARDIAN (June 28, 2016); see also Kelly Phillips Erb, Are We Ready for Robot
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technologists are now beginning to claim that there is no difference between
their software and personal legal expertise. Journalists push the DoNotPay
app as a “robot lawyer.”59 and the DoNotPay first page states “DoNotPay has
launched the UK's first robot lawyer as an experiment. It can talk to you,
generate documents and answer questions. It is just like a real lawyer, but is
completely free and doesn't charge any commission.”60 But attorney-client
interactions are not experiments. A lawyer is obliged to offer the best advice
she can, and to take responsibility for falling below a certain standard of
care.61 Just as a physician has a fiduciary duty do conscientiously divide
treatment between clinical care and medical experimentation (with a very
different set of rules and obligations governing each), a lawyer cannot abide
by rules of professional ethics if she (or software she has written) is A/B
testing various legal strategies on clients without letting them know the nature
of the experimentation.62 App-driven legal tech like DoNotPay is not a
lawyer, robot or otherwise, no matter how much hype it attracts.
One also wonders exactly how much DoNotPay adds to existing
efforts to expand access to law by firms like Nolo, which have provided forms
for years.63 Browder’s chatbot provides forms. It does not fill them out. It
relies on users to apply rules to the facts. Moreover, unlike an ethically
Tim Eigo, Robots and the Lawyers Who Love Them, ARIZ. ATT’Y, (July/August 2016)
See DoNotPay Website, http://www.donotpay.co.uk/.
61
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(stating “a lawyer shall not: (1) make an agreement prospectively limiting the lawyer’s
liability to a client for malpractice unless the client is independently represented in making
the agreement; or (2) settle a claim or potential claim for such liability with an unrepresented
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and is given reasonable opportunity to seek the advice of independent legal counsel in
connection therewith.”). See also Rule 1.8(h), New York Rules of Professional Conduct,
April 1, 2009; Swift v. Choe, 242 A.D.2d 188, 674 N.Y.S.2d 17 (App. Div. 1998).
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practicing attorney, it shifts the risk of error to its ostensible client.64 Indeed,
Browder’s app goes further; its users “agree to indemnify, defend and hold
harmless [DoNotPay and Browder], our directors, officers, employees and
licensors from and against any claim, liability, cost, damage or loss we may
incur (including reasonable legal fees) as a result of any material that you
post, transmit and download on our site or via any other communications
systems.”65 The magnanimity of DoNotPay’s public relations campaign ends
here. A human professional accepts consequences when things go badly
wrong. This “robot lawyer,” by contrast, does not merely refuse to take
responsibility, but holds the “client” responsible when its proprietor is
harmed by their interaction.
II. PLANS FOR FUTURE SUBSTITUTIVE LEGAL AUTOMATION
The most widespread examples of substitutive legal automation exist
in the consumer sphere, in fields like tax, will preparation, and traffic
disputes. Even in these relatively sedate areas of practice, they have raised
serious ethical concerns about unintended consequences and consumer
protection. But on balance, substitutive legal automation in these fields is a
laudable phenomenon when the stakes of a matter are low. Numerous studies
document unmet legal needs among those of low-to-middle socioeconomic
status in the United States.66 Software may be the only form of advice
available to many citizens, and even many small businesses.
See DoNotPay Terms of Service, http://www.donotpay.co.uk/terms.php (“You
acknowledge and agree that you bear full responsibility for your own DoNotPay.co.uk
research and decisions and that we shall not be liable for any action that you or others take
or don't take based on your use of or reliance on information provided by us or other users
of our Site.”).
65
Id.
66
Dion Chu, Matthew R. Greenfield & Peter Zuckerman, Measuring the Justice Gap: Flaws
in the Interstate Allocation of Civil Legal Services Funding and a Proposed Remedy, 33
PACE L. REV. 965 (2013) (“Underscoring the extent of this “justice gap,” the LSC concluded
in 2009 that: (i) “for every client served by an LSC-funded program,” one had to be turned
away because of inadequate resources; (ii) fewer than twenty percent (20%) of legal
problems encountered by low-income people were addressed by a lawyer; (iii) only one legal
aid attorney was available for every 6415 low-income individuals (in contrast, one private
attorney was available for every 429 individuals above the LSC-eligible income threshold);
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Early successes in consumer services have inspired a new generation
of legal automators to push for businesses and governments to standardize
and computerize work once done by attorneys (or other personnel who
interpreted and applied law). The promise here is less “access to justice” than
“reducing legal spending.” Cost savings are a powerful argument in an era of
increasing global competition and declining state revenues. But in many
cases, the automation of legal services hides the externalization of cost and
risk to customers, citizens, and business rivals. The immediate savings in
personnel costs are obvious; the long-term costs are highlighted below.
Already documented in extant legal automation projects, these costs are also
foreseeable in idealistic proposals to accelerate the robotization of law.
A. Requirements Extraction as Privacy Compliance
For legal futurists, legal processes are essentially algorithmic in
nature: data (the facts) are transformed into outputs (a judgment or result) via
application of set rules.67 This model is easiest to imagine in the realm of
financial contracts: for example, a contract may require someone to buy 100
shares of stock at $10 a share from a counterparty if the price of gold falls
below $800 an ounce. If both parties can agree to an authoritative source of
data on the price of gold, a way to escrow the shares and the money needed
to buy them, and an automated way of enabling the transfer of ownership of
the shares once the gold price condition is triggered, the contract is effectively
automated.
Dividing transactions into dozens or hundreds of component parts like
this may seem like a tempting target for efficiency mavens. However, the
legal world can become intractable for programs once a bit more complexity
(such as jurisdictional or constitutional concerns, preemption doctrines, or
and (iv) state courts were experiencing large increases in the number of unrepresented
litigants unable to afford a lawyer.) (quoting Legal Servs. Corp., Documenting the Justice
Gap in America: The Current Unmet Civil Needs of Low Income Americans 1 (2009),
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/marketresearch/PublicDocuments/
JusticeGaInAmerica2009.authcheckdam.pdf.
67
DAVID HOWARTH, LAW AS ENGINEERING (2014); see also David Howarth, Is Law a
Humanity?, 3 ARTS & HUMANITIES IN HIGH. EDUC. 9, 11–12 (2004).
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statutory carve-outs in a largely common law topic) enters the picture. That
is one reason why so much energy is now directed toward legal technology
for business-to-business transactions.
For example, teams of programmers and attorneys led by Travis
Breaux at the computer science department of Carnegie Mellon University
have modeled the problem of compliance with privacy law as one of inputs
(data) and outputs (certain restrictions on the scope and extent of data sharing
permissible). Under federal health privacy law, a large hospital may enter into
over 500 business associate agreements with firms ranging from credit card
companies to cloud vendors.68 These contracts are designed to specify
restrictions on the extent to which personal health information may be
transferred from the hospital, as a covered entity, to other entities.69
Breaux and his co-authors have analyzed regulations and policies,
breaking them into constituent semantics (the meaning of particular terms)
and syntax (the legally prescribed relations among terms). They program
computers to generate compliance outputs for particular scenarios.70 For
example, a patient’s health record at their primary care physician’s office may
indicate that the patient has diabetes. Once that data about diabetes is in the
relevant database, certain restrictions may be superimposed on it. The data
may always be accessible to the patient herself, or to other physicians seeking
to treat the patient.71 It may only be used for marketing purposes if a specific
consent has been signed.72
68

Frank Pasquale & Tara Adams Ragone, Protecting Health Privacy in an Era of Big Data
Processing and Cloud Computing, 17 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 595, 618 (2014).
69
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(2009).
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To convert contracts and statutes into computer code, Breaux and
affiliated researchers have deployed semantic parameterization, “in which
rights and obligations from regulation texts are restated into restricted natural
language statements, to describe discrete activities.”73 For example, a
regulatory provision requiring that a health care provider must “post the
notice for an individual to read” is divided into the subject of the requirement
(the health care provider), the action (post), the object (a notice specifying
data policies), and a purpose (getting an individual to read the notice).74 That
purpose has a new set of atomic building blocks: the subject (an individual
patient), an action (read), and an object (the notice).75
Such decomposition of legal requirements into their component parts,
coupled with rigorous definitions of the parts, is a valuable pedagogical and
research tool. It promotes a careful parsing of legal terms and raises
interesting questions about the meaning of terms like “read” and “notice” in
a wide variety of settings. It is a helpful way of structuring questions about
what a regulation or statute states propositionally. However, even a regulation
as simple as this posting requirement raises further ambiguities about the
meaning of the terms involved. What exactly must be in the notice? When
the law specifies that the notice is “for an individual to read,” does that create
any obligation on the provider to ensure reading actually occurs? How would
that be validated?
To be sure, questions like this do not paralyze the average compliance
staff at a hospital or ambulatory surgical center. Notices are drafted, patients
sign to indicate that they have read them, and medical care is delivered. But
these notices are also tailored to settings. A notice in a setting with many
English-as-a-second-language speakers may only ideally reflect that
community’s concerns if it is designed and presented in a way distinct from
73

Travis D. Breaux et al., Towards Regulatory Compliance: Extracting Rights and
Obligations to Align Requirements with Regulations, IEEE 14TH INT’L REQUIREMENTS
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the privacy rules in HIPAA. Id.
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Breaux et al., supra note 73, at 6.
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that dispensed in, say, a place without those demographic characteristics.76 A
patient may refuse to sign—what then? May the notice requirement be met
by an email sent before the patient’s visit—or after? A computational
response to each of these eventualities is imaginable, and could be
programmed into a robotic registration kiosk.77 However, there is also a fair
chance that a person who, say, resists signing, will simply stand before an
automated registration kiosk, helpless, before a person at the health care
provider assists them.
The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) is
complicated enough to computerize.78 Health sector businesses now aspire to
a multi-jurisdictional analysis of legal requirements to ensure business
compliance for privacy generally. That would require incorporating, at a
minimum, the privacy restrictions of American states, the federal
government, and those of other governments where a firm may wish to
transfer data.79 A CMU-based team has also addressed datasets including “the
100 most frequently occurring semi-structured goals mined from over 100
privacy policies.”80 The research trajectory is ambitious: Breaux and another
co-author “plan to further validate this methodology, heuristics and patterns
within the context of financial regulations and aviation standards to determine
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its applicability beyond healthcare.”81
Privacy and cybersecurity
requirements are a key target for such automation.82
But before cost-containing general counsel become too excited about
the automation of compliance, they should recognize the limits of this
research. Breaux et al. concede that “[w]ithout further validation, it is
premature to automate that which is currently performed manually.”83 Even
more troublingly, they concede that “the role of constraints in identifying
conflicts between rights and obligations must still be considered. Herein, we
only identify trivial conflicts by observing negation and type-similar values
in semantic models.”84 Such conflicts are common in information law: for
example, the same firm may be under duties of non-spoliation and
preservation (which require data to be maintained), and duties of dataminimization (which may include the need to respect customers’ or business
partners’ demands to delete data).85 Careful management of such conflicts is
bread-and-butter work for attorneys, and requires human judgment about the
balance of risks involved in any data retention strategy.86
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B. Smart Contracts as Linguistic Robots
A DVD may only be licensed for play in the US and Europe, and then
be “coded” so it can only play in those regions and not others.87 Were a person
playing the DVD for the user, he might demand a copy of the DVD’s terms
of use and receipt, to see if it was authorized for playing in a given area.
Computers need such a term translated into a language they can
“understand;” or, in another characterization, the legal terms embedded in the
DVD (and the environment of the program that runs it) must lead to
predictable reactions from the hardware that encounters them.88
These programs are still in their infancy, leading to predictable
frustrations for users. Reactions to digital rights management software range
from annoyance to outrage; online forums are full of advice on how to defeat
the DVD zoning software. But to the extent laws articulate simple binaries of
easily programmable desiderata, this automation may still have a bright
future. For example, if the copryright law of a given country suddenly forbids
the playing of certain media in computers, a Legal Requirements
Specification Language (LRSL) may be hard coded into devices, enabling a
centralized authority to simply flip a switch to automate compliance.89 Such
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tools can also reformulate certain laws and present them as compliance
requirements to a layperson.90
Parties may also be more willing to enter into contracts if they can be
assured of some degree of “automatic,” code-based enforcement.91 When it
comes to simple supply chain management, there is some real promise for
computable contracts. Imagine, for instance, a ship coming into port with 50
tons of sugar in containers. Assuming sensors that are capable of identifying
sugar, and assaying its weight and quality, and automated exchange could be
devised. In some sense, virtually anyone who shops on Amazon experiences
a similarly automatic exchange after a “one-click” transaction. As a former
commissioner of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission recently
observed, “Where a smart contract’s conditions depend upon real-world data
(e.g., the price of a commodity future at a given time), agreed-upon outside
systems, called oracles, can be developed to monitor and verify prices,
performance, or other real-world events.”92
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When it comes to more complex products, automation of elements of
exchange can run into difficulties. Chickens, for example, might be a more
difficult product to assess, or even weigh, then a standardized commodity like
sugar. In a classic court case, Frigaliment v. B.N.S. International Sales Corp.,
the litigants disagreed vehemently on what the meaning of the word chicken
was in a contract.93 Robotic assessments of physical reality are still delayed
and corroded by a lack of data, or the messy complexity of discordant human
meanings.94
Therefore, legal automators have focused most of their energy on
contracts related to online activity. For example, Oliver Goodenough of
Vermont Law School and Mark Flood of the Office of Financial Research
have developed the idea of smart contracts as “automatons” for executing
deals once financial agreements have been represented computationally.
Goodenough and Flood argue that “the fundamental legal structure of a wellwritten financial contract follows a state-transition logic that can be
formalized mathematically as a finite-state machine (also known as a finitestate automaton),” where the “automaton defines the states that a financial
relationship can be in, such as ‘default,’ ‘delinquency,’ ‘performing,” etc.,
and it defines an “alphabet” of events that can trigger state transitions, such
as “payment arrives,” “due date passes,” and many more.95
For Goodenough and Flood, a sufficiently automated system could
increase both trust and efficiency among contracting parties. For example, an
airline may promise an insurer that it will pay $10,000 on the first day of each
month in order to purchase an insurance policy, which pays out $100,000
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each month the average price of oil is above $90 a barrel. A contract like this,
often called a “derivative,” helps airlines hedge against rises in fuel prices.
Goodenough and Flood believe that an automaton could effectively robotize
the relationship between the parties. The insurer could agree to an automatic
transfer of $100,000 once another computer program indicated that it had
calculated the average price of oil that month, and it was below $90 a barrel.
The airline could enable automatic debiting of its bank account when that
event occurs. Programmers could also decide what to do if, for some reason,
the $10,000 did not come in by midnight of the first day of the month.
The question of consequences for failure to meet the terms of the
contract is a difficult one, which has major implications for the future of
automation in many legal fields. There are always potential excuses--for
example, the bank may have failed to transmit the funds, a new employee
may have changed the accounts, or the insurer may have altered its own
accounts in a way that made it difficult to pay. We all have some intuitive
sense of what we would decide to be a fair resolution of any of these
situations—or, more to the point, where a contract or statute might refer the
dispute.96 But it is a far more formidable task to program that type of
insight—let alone the ability to verify the factual predicates of each
situation—into a single computer, or even into a network system capable of
surveillance of all the parties involved.
That is one reason why a wise programmer may decide simply to kick
the dispute over to a panel of human mediators, who could be charged with
quickly deciding whether the airline’s excuse for the delayed payment was
sufficient to permit it to continue the contract, or enabled the insurer to
terminate it. In other words, humans complementing the automated legal
system would likely be the optimal result for all parties involved. We see this
pattern repeatedly in the history of automation. For example, a computer first
beat a chess grandmaster in the 1990s; by the mid-2000s, no grandmaster
could defeat the best programs. However, a combination of human and
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machine can defeat the best chess playing machines to this day.97 Similar
cooperative modes are likely to prove optimal in legal contexts, particularly
when the stakes of a dispute are high.98
Nevertheless, regulators have urged (and in some cases required)
financial institutions to express their contractual arrangements as code. CFTC
and SEC staff concluded in a report “that current technology is capable of
representing derivatives using a common set of computer- readable
descriptions[, which] are precise enough to use both for the calculation of net
exposures and to serve as part or all of a binding legal contract.”99 That
optimism was also reflected in the agencies’ treatment of other securities. For
example, the Securities and Exchange Commission “Securities Exchange
Commission (SEC) recently finalized a rule requiring providers of some
asset-backed securities (ABS’s) to file “downloadable source code in
Python” to reflect the contractual arrangements embedded in the securities.100
Despite that regulatory advance, requiring “filing of a waterfall
computer program of the contractual cash flow provisions of the securities”
remains an outstanding proposal for the SEC.101 On first glance, this
forbearance is puzzling—uncertainties about cash flows in ABS’s helped
spark the financial crisis of 2008, which was one of the main motivations
97
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behind the Dodd-Frank Act (which had required the SEC to better monitor
the ABS market).102 However, the agency’s reticence reflected valid concerns
among commenters representing financial institutions. For example,
JPMorgan complained that “each ABS transaction has its own distinct
characteristics,” and it would be expensive and of questionable utility to
reduce each new one to Python code.103 AmeriCredit bluntly stated that it
“should not be forced to predict and therefore program every possible slight
iteration of all waterfall payments” because its firm “runs a business that
purchases and services automobile loans, not a software development
business.”104 UBMatrix expressed the view that programming obligations
was not superior, in either accuracy or transparency, to simply writing them
in text.105
A common theme animated comments on the proposal for the
computerization of cash-flows in asset-backed securities. The SEC was
promoting a one-size-fits-all requirement of translating legal agreements into
software, while market realities precluded such standardization—or made it
too expensive to be practicable.106 The ensuing barriers to computerization
here should be a cautionary tale for advocates of legal process automation
102
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who berate the legal profession for providing “bespoke” services when, they
say, mass production would do.107
The “bespoke” metaphor does a great deal of rhetorical work which
is rarely unpacked by those touting it. A bespoke suit is a luxury, unneeded
by most. The very wealthy may get their clothing personally tailored, but the
rest of society makes do with ready-to-wear outfits. The simile between
clothing manufacture and legal services breaks down in any moderately
complex dispute. Anyone can look in the mirror and figure out whether his
clothing fits or not. Legal advice is a credence service – it is very hard for the
average person to know if he has been well advised.108 Thus we should be
cautious when the startup Deftr rolls out its services with the motto, “law is
not a Rolex,” and implies that democratized law should be as accessible as
personalized time is now—from “a glance at my phone.”109 The statements
are more reflective of business aspirations and anti-worker ideology than a
solid read of the legal market.
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In both the 1930s and the 1960s, leading economic commentators in
the United States predicted permanent, mass unemployment thanks to the rise
of machine substitutes for workers—exactly the type of commoditization
Deftr both predicts and celebrates for attorneys.110 Like popular and trade
press articles on “the end of lawyers,” their narrative is a simple one: a)
software programs are getting better at recognizing patterns and even
meaning in texts, b) most of legal practice is primarily about applying rules
to factual situations, or predicting how the relevant authorities would apply
the rules to a situation, c) computer programmers also apply rules to facts,
and as the profession of coding advances, it will take over more and more
rule-application scenarios. But even simple scenarios may disclose layers of
complexity and uncertainty impossible to be properly coded into software or
forms. 111
Consider, first, the question of meaning. Legal processes are
concerned with explanation and judgment—a very different set of concerns
than the predictive modeling and pattern recognition common in most legal
automation.112 A legal decisionmaker is not simply trying to ensure that some
result (liable or not liable, guilty or innocent) matches the results generated
by the case documents including patterns of words most similar to the
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patterns of words in the case documents before the decisionmaker.113 Rather,
the decisionmaker is assessing the meaning of the facts and the meaning of
the law in the situation. Legal functions that seem routine to a non-lawyer
may create scenarios that require policy judgment, wisdom, and a
responsibility akin to legislation or governance.114
Consider, for instance, a very common problem in the United States
chronicled in David Dayen’s book, Chain of Title.115 After the financial crisis
of 2008, banks were foreclosing on millions of homeowners. Many
homeowners tried to negotiate for restructuring of their debt, but debt
servicers turned them away. Some homeowners noticed that the entities on
the paperwork filed for the foreclosure did not seem to match the paperwork
they were sent when their mortgage was sold to a trust in order to complete a
mortgage-backed security.116 As Dayen chronicles, many of the banks and
the trusts holding mortgage-backed securities did not in fact fill out the
correct paperwork in order to verify their claim to ownership of the property
they were suing for.
This was a genuinely new situation in property law. Lawyers had to
rapidly analyze the relevant law and make a novel case for their clients.
Moreover, in many states, this was not a situation where homeowners could
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wait for an app to parse their problems. For example, in New York,
foreclosure notices often contained a warning that those served with them had
to dispute the ownership of the property by the mortgagee (if they wished to
do so) within twenty days of receiving the notice.117 A minimally competent
lawyer working in this field would know that the status of a defense as either
jurisdictional or waivable would be a matter of utmost urgency to the
client.118 Sadly, basic terms like these are either unknown or unappreciated
by many of the coders now aspiring to computerize legal advice.
Of course, few outside the foreclosure industry would endorse the
severity of the twenty-day rule, or similar inflexibilities in legal systems.
They are noted here to mark the extreme inappropriateness of many aspects
of the Silicon Valley start-up mentality in contemporary legal practice.119
The legal trade press—often funded by advertising dollars from legaltech
firms—tends toward blanket characterizations of disruptive firms as a breath
of fresh air for a stodgy legal profession.120 They gloss over the fact that good
legal practice is built upon care, meticulousness, and proofreading because
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mistakes can be irreversible—filings have page limits,121 many issues not
raised at trial cannot be raised on appeal,122 and in some situations even
“actual innocence” is not enough to spare a wrongfully convicted inmate
from the death penalty.123
C. Blockchain as a Substitute for Property Recordation
The persistence of bespoke contracts (and regulatory responses to
them) is likely in the realm of high finance. Contracts are too complex and
variable, and require too much human judgment, to be reliably coded into
software. Code may reflect and in large part implement what the parties
intended, but it cannot itself serve as the contract or business agreement
among them.
Still, some technologists and lawyers aspire to that subsumption,
echoing older movements for financial deregulation.124 The rise of Bitcoin as
an alternative currency has sparked an interest in automation of transactions
and recordation.125 Software can allow distributed computers to transfer
information en masse and monitor one another.126 Bitcoin is a particular case
of using blockchain technology to ensure a durable record of ownership,
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which is intended to be regulated by code.127 Blockchain enthusiasts envision
it scaling en masse to serve as a distributed ledger of all manner of
transactions.
Consider a simple transaction: the transfer of title of a car. At present,
this type of transfer may take a trip, in person, to the Department of Motor
Vehicles (DMV), and filling out paperwork is a prerequisite for a valid
transfer.
In the case of car titles, we can think of the DMV as a kind of bank:
just as banks monitor when money has been deposited or spent, the DMV
maintains a record of when, for any given person or legal entity, the
ownership of a car begins or ends. Blockchain software could store, on
distributed computers, a complete list of who owns which car, just as peer to
peer file sharing software maintains a list of locations of where given (parts
of) files are located. 128 Anyone can instantly transmit to all the other
computers his desire to transfer ownership of his car to a willing buyer.129
127
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The same system could also be programmed to coordinate the transmission
of the seller’s “I’ve sold my car” signal with the seller’s “I’ve just deposited
$5,000 in the buyer’s bank account” signal. Blockchain enthusiasts aim to
render not just DMVs, but banks and other institutions of trust, obsolete.130
While the computational processes here may be complex, their
recordation function is relatively simple. Each transaction is modeled as a
link in a chain, and the public ledgers at any given time reflect a “block” of
all past transactions.131 Thus the name “Blockchain” boils down to a physical
metaphor (a chain of blocks) for socio-technical arrangement. And we see
glimmers of this kind of distributed trust already in software like Venmo,
which runs on top of Facebook and allows instantaneous monetary transfers
among friends.132 Finance apps that run on top of China’s WeChat messaging
system are even more powerful and pervasive.133 A blockchain for
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transferring title could essentially amount to a digital key.134 Once the owner
was recognized by the system as a whole, that system’s assent to his locking
or unlocking his car would seem to be more robust than physical keys (which
can be lost) or keychain signal transmitters (which break easily). A series of
numbers, verified by the public ledger, would be the new “key” to ownership
or access.
Given enthusiasm expressed for blockchain at the highest levels of
international finance and the federal government,135 states may soon explore
replacing the title transfer function of their DMVs with a blockchain-based,
public ledger of ownership transactions. Such a digital transition would cut
out a fair number of annoying, time-consuming trips. Some state workers
would lose their jobs—but most do not seem all that enthusiastic to be
pushing paper in windowless warrens. Using technology to modernize
transactions would seem to be a huge opportunity for politicians eager to both
save personnel costs and reduce inconvenience for constituents.136
Yet there are also reasons for caution. Blockchain advocates have not
fully clarified what happens if someone ignores computational descriptions
of legal reality. For example, imagine if the seller above simply fails to
deliver the car. Can the buyer call the police to seize the car? Must the buyer
134
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file a lien? If the buyer does file suit, is the state of the public ledger
conclusive evidence of the transfer?
The lawyer/coder James Grimmelmann and Arvind Narayanan
(coauthor of one of the leading textbooks on blockchain technology) have
raised these questions in a brief but devastating critique of the fragility of
distributed ledgers.137 If a hacker manages to copy the number-series used by
a car’s owner, the hacker might easily transfer both the car—and the record
of who owns it—to someone else.138 In other words: while legal automation
giveth, it also taketh away. The normal car title recordation system can be
tiresomely meticulous and redundant, but it also offers resilience.139 A state
database is a record of ownership distinct from the blockchain. So even if
automated title transfer became popular, it would seem necessary to keep
some official backup.140
Despite such problems, there is still enormous enthusiasm for more
widespread adoption of legal technology. Part of this enthusiasm stems from
investors looking for new sectors to conquer. Venture capitalist Marc
Andreessen spoke for many when he hoped, in the Wall Street Journal, for
software to “eat the world”—that is, for programs (and robots animated by
them) to perform tasks once done by humans.141 A good number of lawyers
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share that enthusiasm. That may seem odd—who wants to be replaced by a
machine?142 One reason is a classic desire of one part of the profession to
assert a kind of superiority over the rest.143 Some are prone to view the
practice of law with detachment and disdain, presuming it to be a rote and
formalistic affair easily boiled down to a set of programmable propositions.
Combine that condescension with contrived but powerful business
imperatives to “reduce legal spend,” and the legaltech revolution always
seems near at hand.
Thus there is a steady drumbeat of articles proposing distributed
ledgers for a wide variety of applications in law. Some propose blockchain
technology as a way for businesses to maintain a ledger for timekeeping,
billing, financial transactions, and other records—a modest step that does not
implicate the types of coordination and interoperability problems discussed
above.144 Michael Abramowicz’s Cryptocurrency-Based Law outlines an
ambitious vision for using blockchain applications to coordinate endeavors
now organized via law.145 Rather than voting shares in meetings, participants
in an organization could bid with BitCoins to promote one course of action
over others.146 One of the great appeals of blockchain, as opposed to other
software, is its supposedly immutable character—that is, its resistance to
being altered once its parameters have been coded.147 Automobile lenders
have already introduced the basic foundations of such technology: when
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payments are late, a “starter interrupt device” can disable a debtor’s car.148
The payment of funds held in escrow could also be “self-executing,” once
some code-specified trigger was tripped.149 Trust law could also enable peerto-peer decision making processes to reduce transaction costs for
disbursements.150 Abramowicz even foresees the spread of blockchain to
investment firms,151 both for core business purposes, and to engage in
regulatory arbitrage.152 He also sees a role for blockchain applications in
insurance.153
Legal scholars have also prescribed potential blockchain-enabled
management of micropayments.154 In the past, when Congress realized that
new technology would lead to widespread copying, it imposed a small fee per
copy—a practice known as compulsory licensing.155 This regime, still in
place for many works, separates compensation (for works) from control (over
their use).156 For blockchain advocates, software could take on the role of
148
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law—artists could make their work exclusively available via blockchain
applications, setting their own rates for downloads or streams of copyrighted
works.157 The ultimate promise here is to set up systems of content
distribution that balance commercial imperatives and creative freedoms in a
more nimble manner than current law.158
Framed as parts of an existing legal system, all of these proposals
disclose promising applications of social software. However, they are
occasionally promoted as a substitute for the legal system itself. That
substitution would reflect not merely the algorithmic application of rules, but
the values of other human beings trusted as participants in governance, and
not merely as appliers of technical rules. Engineers with little or no domain
expertise in the legal profession cannot code software designed to replace that
governance, and those with such domain expertise would be wise to decline
to do so, as the next section shows.
D. The Inescapability of Governance
Though sober reports from the World Economic Forum, Deloitte, and
governmental entities give a good sense of the incrementalist side of fintech,
much of the excitement about the topic of financial technology arises out of
a more futuristic perspective. On Twitter, hashtags like #legaltech, #regtech,
#insurtech, and #fintech often convene enthusiasts who aspire to
revolutionize the financial landscape—or at least to make a good deal of
money disrupting existing “trust institutions” (e.g., the intermediaries which
help store and transfer financial assets).
For many advocates of cryptocurrencies, the blockchain’s
cryptography is celebrated as a democratization of encryption.159 Given their
distributed nature, blockchains are also touted as way to create an alternative
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157
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legal system, beyond the reach of traditional legal authorities.160 Ironically,
the same celebrations of the power of blockchain applications also tend to
worry that premature regulation could limit the impact of blockchains.161
They should clarify whether any programs really are “unstoppable,” or
whether regulation and force could stifle them.
Immutability is the main characteristic of blockchain that is supposed
to set it apart from past social software, and enable it to replace, rather than
merely operate as an adjunct to, existing legal systems.162 Those accepting
the terms of the relevant code are assured that, whatever happens to the rest
of the world in the future, their transactions are guaranteed to be valid.
Are blockchains really capable of preventing hacking or tampering?
Short of a fortified HAL 9000 terminating would-be hackers before they
could access the relevant blockchains, it is hard to imagine such assurances
being verifiable.163 When billed as a replacement for law or lawyers, code
immediately runs into both conceptual and practical difficulties.
Moreover, some early adopters of this ideal of self-executing or coded
law have experienced troubling and telling failures.164 Investors in a
“decentralized autonomous organization” (DAO) run on code have already
experienced the turbulent and troubling aspects of software-governed legal
orders. In early 2016, a hacker managed to take millions of dollars in a
fashion unanticipated by the drafters of the code governing the
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organization.165 The main organizer of the DAO, Vitalik Buterin, then was
able to retaliate because the code only enabled the withdrawal of funds after
a 27-day waiting period. 166 He coded a “hard fork” for the organization,
which essentially shifted funds from the hacker’s account to an account
where the original investors in the project could withdraw their funds.167
According to Buterin and other organizers of the DAO, this
intervention was a success story: it proved the recoverability of their system.
But for advocates of legal automation, this was a Pyrrhic victory. The post
hoc intervention violated the principle of autonomy supposedly at the core of
the DAO.168 Persons managed the smart contract—not mere code.169 In other
words, the only way the supposedly smart, incorruptible, automated, and
immutable contract actually protected investors was by allowing human
intervention to change its terms and consequences. Rather than
demonstrating the dispensability of human interventions, the DAO has
proved the opposite—the vital necessity of human governance over even
165
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extensively coded and computerized forms of human cooperation. And this
governance, to the extent it was legitimate, could only be known to be so,
thanks to the explanation offered by the DAO’s sponsors—an explanation
made in language, not code.
Blockchain enthusiasts need to directly address these concerns before
promoting further substitutive automation of law. It is tempting to view
software as an all-purpose way of dispatching with middlemen like lawyers
and banks. But, as James Grimmelmann observed in 2005, “software is
vulnerable to sudden failure, software is hackable, and software is not
robust.”170 No technology has developed that would make the blockchain
environment impervious to these problems.171 Indeed, precisely the opposite
is true: waves of hacking and illicit intrusions have rocked health care
institutions,172 banks,173 and even campaigns174 and governments.175
The question of vulnerabilities is critical to defining the normative
core and legal standing of blockchain projects. For example, in the DAO
incident mentioned above, some argued that the hacker was the one who truly
understood the spirit of blockchain, because the hacker’s actions were
allowed under the coding of the DAO.176 If the real core of blockchain is
170
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unstoppable automation via code, then the hacker should be allowed to keep
the funds taken. Reversing the hacking is a reflection of values outside the
smart contract, as it existed at the time the hack happened. Those are legal
and political values that need to be fully articulated: who gets to be part of
the decisionmaking cadre? Is it a Wikipedia-style project of collaboration
structured by hierarchy? 177 If so, is there anything to learn from Wikipedia’s
problems and limits?178 Do Blockchain projects’ commitments to
decentralization have to yield when certain problems in smart contracts are
exposed? If so, how are these “constitutional moments” (to apply Bruce
Ackerman’s constitutionalist term of art to digitized law) recognizable?179
The problem of “irreversibility” also needs to be clarified as to its
technical and legal dimensions. Does it mean that 1) legal rules or contracts
will preclude blockchain-connected parties from availing themselves of the
legal system? Or 2) is there something inherent in the code that makes
reversibility much harder? Or 3) is the code, at present, a way of evading or
avoiding legal re-examination of the transaction, and could eventually be
reformed to make the transactions more amenable to legal reversibility?
Possibilities 1 and 3 would be a reassuring message—but would also
undermine blockchain enthusiasts’ claims about the novelty of blockchain
scenarios (since 1 is already a standard part of consumer contracts
disclaiming liability, and 3 is a problem that has faced regulators for at least
a decade).
There is also a basic conflict over the nomenclature of blockchain
projects. They can either be public and permissionless, or private and
177
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permissioned.180 Major banks, government institutions, and global forums
tend to promote private and permissioned blockchains. This distinction is
critical
because,
at
present,
the
private/permissioned
and
public/permissionless schools of blockchain appear to be trading off one
another’s distinctive appeal. For example, high-level banking managers style
themselves as tribunes of the people for advancing blockchain, pointing to
the idealistic impulses of the public/permissionless school.181 Meanwhile,
those advocating public/permissionless blockchains try to demonstrate just
how serious and pragmatic they are by highlighting support for the
technology among high-level government officials and business leaders. The
two groups are actually talking about very different phenomena—and
scholarly work should illuminate that tension, rather than trying to downplay
it in the name of preserving unity in the blockchain community.
When De Filippi and Hassan speak of the “incorporation of legal rules
into code” and “regulation by code,” culminating in a reliance on code “not
only to enforce legal rules, but also to draft and elaborate these rules,” they
do not present these phenomena as unalloyed goods.182 Rather, they are
cautious about the “the prospect of automated legal governance” because it
“Private (permissioned) blockchains are common ledgers shared amongst a known group
of parties with only certain parties having the ability, or permission, to make changes to the
ledger. Public (permissionless) blockchains like Bitcoin's are publicly available common
ledgers that allow anyone who runs the Bitcoin software to participate in making changes to
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may “reduce the freedoms and autonomy of individuals.”183 The answer to
these concerns is not to double down on the translation of legal rules into
code. Rather, the preservation of human control over legal systems will
require an alternative paradigm—a vision of software as a tool to assist
persons, rather than a machine replacing them. Nor should policymakers
abandon long-standing principles of financial regulation to make way for
forms of financial automation that have yet to be proven. There is little
evidence that regulation means their “revolutionary promise” would be lost,
as it was probably never there in the first place.184
III. PROMOTING COMPLEMENTARY AUTOMATION IN LAW
For many legal futurists, substitutive automation—the rise of robot
lawyers to replace current associates and partners—is the long-term goal of
legal technology.185 They see early advances in this direction—such as a
chatbot to dispute parking tickets—as part of a general trend toward a “rise
of the robots” in 21st century political economy.186 This technologically
determined narrative of progress reflects a larger movement among
economists and engineers to cast human labor itself as a thing of the past,
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ideally replaced by a full automation of present jobs.187 But this is just one
vision of human progress—and not a very attractive one.188
The legal futurists’ partial vision of economic progress reflects a
similarly incomplete normative account of the rule of law—one that asks both
too much, and too little, of legal institutions. Whatever other normative goals
judges and regulators pursue, they should adhere to the rule of law. Richard
Fallon has observed that there are at least three distinct ideal-typical accounts
of the rule of law in contemporary jurisprudence.189 Legal automators tend to
focus on historicist accounts (which associate the rule of law with “rule by
norms laid down by legitimate lawmaking authorities prior to their
application to particular cases”) and formalism (which defines “the ideal if
not necessary form of ‘law’” as “that of a ‘rule,’ conceived as a clear
prescription that exists prior to its application and that determines appropriate
conduct or legal outcomes.”).190 Were federal health privacy regulation really
reducible to “requirements extraction” encoded in software, that encoding
would amount to a real advance for the rule of law, in its historicist and
formalist conceptions. The law would be as executable as a software
command. Similarly, the translation of traffic rules into a series of chatbot
prompts renders the law into a crystalline form—if not application.
Nevertheless, there is another account of the rule of law, a “Legal
Process conception,” which is more expansive, and more recently developed,
than either the historicist or formalist accounts.191 As Fallon explains:
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Legal Process conceptions find the requisites of "law" necessary for
the Rule of Law to be satisfied by a mixture of (i) procedural fairness
in the development and application of legal norms, (ii) an (assumed)
internal connection between notions of law and reasonableness, (iii)
reasoned elaboration of the connection between recognized, preexisting sources of legal authority and the determination of rights and
responsibilities in particular cases, and (iv) judicial review as a
guarantor of procedural fairness and rational deliberation by
legislative, executive, and administrative decisionmakers.192
This elaborate definition may seem awkward in comparison with the
relatively compact accounts of the historicist and formalist schools. While
those approaches emphasis the “rule” side of the rule of law, the Legal
Process approach emphasizes “law” as its core component. Law as a social
institution is multi-faceted and embedded in particular political systems and
traditions, such as rights to appeal and explanations for decisions. To the
extent a legal technology like a smart contract reduces a legal relationship to
a “clear prescription that exists prior to its application and that determines
appropriate conduct or legal outcomes” (exemplifying the formalist
conception of the rule of law), it is unlikely to meet the complex standards of
review and appeal embodied in the Legal Process conception of the rule of
law.193
When conflicts over interpretation arise, the Legal Process approach
to the rule of law demands the clashing parties are offered “reasoned
elaboration of the connection between recognized, pre-existing sources of
legal authority and the determination of rights and responsibilities in

(2005); LAURA KALMAN, THE STRANGE CAREER OF LEGAL LIBERALISM 20 (1998)
(describing emergence of the Legal Process school.).
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Id. at 18. Fallon’s list of aspects of Legal Process conceptions of the rule of law is drawn
from the locus classicus of the Legal Process approach. Id. (citing HENRY M. HART, JR. &
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APPLICATION OF LAW 4–5, 152–53, 157–58, 695 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P.
Frickey eds., 1994)).
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particular cases”—not simple disposition of their cases via code.194 Nor do
ad hoc interventions, like those pursued after the DAO hack discussed above,
guarantee the “procedural fairness and rational deliberation” contemplated by
a Legal Process conception of the rule of law.195 One-sided deployments of
vastly superior legal-technological resources also undermine the types of
dialogue and fair play valued by the Legal Process school.
Fallon has called for the integration of the many strands of meaning
in “the rule of law” tradition into a robust hybrid theory that reflects the
strengths of each.196 Inspired by his approach, this Part develops principles
to guide the future of legal automation in a way that cultivates and develops,
rather than discounts and devalues, attorneys’ skills.
A. Intelligence Augmentation as Regulative Ideal
The right tools make a job far easier—and even engaging. For
example, a truck driver may find that cruise control frees his foot from the
gas pedal for time to stretch and relieve cramps. 197 Automatic transmission
makes it easier to shift from high to low gear.198 Collision avoidance software
can warn him about cars in his blind spot.199 Technology can make the job
much easier—until it replaces the driver altogether.200 There may be a
delicate balance between inventions that help a worker, and those which
replace the worker altogether. Nevertheless, economists recognize this
distinction as fundamental to valuation, calling the former a complement to
labor, and the latter, a substitute for it.201
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In computing, artificial intelligence (AI) research has focused on
technologies that can substitute for human cognition and attention.202 For
example, even in the 1960s, roboticists at the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology were developing mechanical sentries to relieve soldiers of the
boring and dangerous duty of standing guard at vulnerable sites.203 But there
is another way of thinking of the sentry robot—not as AI replacing troops,
but as one more tool to increase their effectiveness. Rather than viewing its
infantry or guards as mere drones, to be dispatched as quickly as a new tool
mimics a critical mass of their functions, a military may invest in its personnel
as skilled operators of increasingly sophisticated machines. Sensors and
computers may be designed to act as a second set of eyes and ears, rapidly
processing threat levels and other data to better inform soldiers’ actions. This
is a type of intelligence augmentation (IA), which has informed far more
projects than AI.204
The friendly rivalry between AI and IA researchers casts a new light
on policy debates over the future of automation in law. Software is frequently
unable to provide the full arrange of services and protections offered by
attorneys.205 Nevertheless, federal policymakers have recently menaced
states which attempt to enforce clear distinctions between automated legal
advice and direct counsel from an attorney. For example, when North
Carolina attempted to modernize its regulation of software-based legal
services, the Federal Trade Commission and Department of Justice weighed
in to criticize the state and threaten antitrust action against it.206 Framed as an
202

JOHN MARKOFF, MACHINES OF LOVING GRACE xii (2015).
Id. at 5.
204
Id. at 16.
205
Brian Sheppard, Incomplete Innovation and the Premature Disruption of Legal Services,
2015 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1797, 1825 (describing how premature disruptions occur when “an
industry has experienced a diminution in its capacity or willingness to meet demand for a
core function at pre-disruption levels of quality, leading to a reduction in welfare that exceeds
the benefits brought by the innovation,” and applying this theory of premature disruption to
legal services).
206
Letter from Marina Lao, Dir. of the FTC Office of Policy Planning & Robert Potter, Chief
of the Legal Policy Section, Antitrust Div. of the U.S. Dep’t of Justice to N.C. Sen. Bill Cook
(June 10, 2016), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/advocacy_documents/
comment-federal-trade-commission-staff-antitrust-division-addressing-north-carolinahouse-bill-436/160610commentncbill.pdf.
203

51

attack on attorney self-protection, the agencies’ intervention had flimsy
foundations in economic policy, and evidenced little to no awareness of
literature on the pitfalls of automation.207 They appear committed to
promoting software as a substitute for attorneys, even though the sellers of
such software often foist exculpatory clauses (or other limitations of liability)
on end users.208 Such clauses prematurely extinguish litigation over bad
outcomes, which could help both attorneys and consumers better understand
the risks involved in AI approaches to law.209 At the very least, federal
antitrust policymakers should promote state bans on such clauses, in order to
provide a more level playing field in the legal services market.
Computer science researchers should also be more open to viewing
the indeterminacy and flexibility of law as features best handled by human
(rather than algorithmic) approaches. In early iterations of expert systems,
programmers attempted to translate the rules governing professionals’
demonstrations of expertise into pseudocode, and then software.210 There
were some successes in law, but the expert system approach never became
widespread. In both transactional and litigation contexts, it was almost
impossible for any truly knowledgeable professional to boil down the sum
total of their knowledge and judgment into a series of propositions applicable
by machine.211 This resistance of human know-how to codification and
207
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standardization persists in many contexts far less complex than legal practice
is today. For example, the economist David Autor argues that even in the next
decade or so, it is highly unlikely that the replacement of a windshield on a
car could be fully automated, even if driving itself is.212
B. Preserving Articulable Standards in an Age of Rules and Brute Force
Prediction
The appeal of pervasive legal automation is based on a certain
conception of the rule of law, and of a legal duty to pursue a type of utility
maximization. Many critics of courts complain that judges simply list
multiple factors to consider, and then offer some gestalt opinion, without
properly distinguishing contrary authority or otherwise reasoning from first
principles to a decision.213 The obvious reform response within the law is to
try to develop some kind of rule to make clear what decisions should be based
on. So, for instance, after Community for Creative Non-violence v. Reid,214 a
leading case on the “independent contractor/employee” distinction in
David Autor, Polanyi’s Paradox and the Shape of Employment Growth 31 (NBER
Working Paper No. 20485, Sept. 2014) (“Modern automobile plants, for example, employ
industrial robots to install windshields on new vehicles as they move through the assembly
line. But aftermarket windshield replacement companies employ technicians, not robots, to
install replacement windshields. Why not robots? Because removing a broken windshield,
preparing the windshield frame to accept a replacement, and fitting a replacement into that
frame demand far more real-time adaptability than any contemporary robot can approach.”);
David H. Autor, Why Are There Still So Many Jobs? The History and Future of the
Workplace Automation, 29 J. ECON. PERSP. 3 (2015).
213
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copyright law, many law review articles tried to isolate payment of payroll
taxes as the touchstone, despite the multi-factor test in the case.215 More
ambitious articles might try to explain variations with elaborate sub-rules, as
treatise writers are prone to typologize cases.216
Despite the ambitions of the systematizers, there are almost always
conflicts among the approaches of multiple courts to similar sets of facts,
irreconcilable by logic or reason. For partisans of predictive analytics in law,
when there is no real rule of decision integrating factors in a reasoned way,
the methods of natural language processing may take aspects of past cases
(such as the filings), model the effects of various phrases or structures of the
documents on the decisionmaker, and then extrapolate those effects in future
cases on the basis of their filings.
To the extent it applies these methods as the optimal way of bringing
order to a confusing area of law, the best way a firm can advise clients is to
have as many fact situations in its database as possible, match their facts to
all the extant facts, and perform brute predictions of what the judges will do.
This form of prediction is much like weather forecasters using big data (rather
than underlying atmospheric dynamics) to predict the movement of storms.217
An algorithmic analysis of a database of, say, 1,000 cold fronts with a given
atmospheric pressure sweeping over Michigan, may (with proper parameters
and algorithms) prove a better predictor of the next cold front’s effects than
a trained meteorologist without access to such a data trove.218
These methods also mirror advances in translation accomplished by
Google over the past decade. Google translate does not deploy some
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hierarchical set of rules to convert a word or phrase or sentence from one
language to another. Rather, it simply tries to match the phrase to be
converted to an identical or similar phrase in an extant, translated document,
and then finds the matching phrase in the translation of that document to use
it in the target context.219 Google’s translation program is not parsing the
meaning of the words it translates. Rather, it is indexing past, human
translations and matching them to current targets. In harder translations, it
may well be extrapolating how best to meld divergent translations—but it
relies on human responses to determine which are better, or worse,
translations.220
Far from being conflicting approaches to automating legal analysis,
expert systems and machine learning approaches based on predictive
analytics are deeply complementary methods of advancing substitutive
automation in law. Once predictive analysts take a distant reading of cases,221
treating the decisionmaker as a black box that takes in inputs (fact patterns)
and generates outputs (judgments), with little clear sense of how input turned
into output, there is pressure to formalize the system.222 Persons rightly
demand some sense of why an outcome occurred. But the more formalized
law becomes, the easier it is to convert its rules to the types of expert systems
deployed in a program like TurboTax.
Thus legal automation software may have an advantage over human
attorneys in extreme scenarios. If law in an area is a complete mess,
219
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algorithmic analyses may find patterns in cases beyond human
comprehension, and successfully brute force a prediction of optimal legal
strategy.223 If the law, by contrast, is perfectly ordered, an expert system can
reduce it to a series of rules to be applied.224 Fortunately for human attorneys,
most living areas of law fit neither description—nor should they. Between
the crystalline clarity of rules and the chaos of unconstrained discretion, there
are articulable standards that help us formulate convincing explanations and
justifications of legal decisionmaking, without foreordaining outcomes in
advance.
Businesses may complain about courts or agencies failing to articulate
a clear rule for applying a statute or rule before a complaint or enforcement
action is lodged against them.225 But this battle was lost in the 1940s.226 As
the Supreme Court decided in Chenery II, there is "a very definite place for
the case-by-case evolution of statutory standards.”227 A humane legal order,
flexibly adapting to new realities and political change, demands nothing less.
223
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Even weather forecasting—an exemplar of so much of the predictive
modeling that motivates efforts to automate law—has recognized the
ineradicable importance of human judgment, as sociologist Phaedra Daipha
observes:
The official NWS [National Weather Service] rhetoric . . . is replete
with reductionist language and technocratic buzzwords, while
forecasters readily subscribe to a naively positivist vision of
science—even when, or precisely because, they keep an ironic
distance from it. On the other hand, NWS operational guidelines
explicitly and repeatedly leave it to forecasters’ judgment and
discretion how numerical prediction models assist them in their
task.228
Even in meteorology, judgment is essential. And unlike judges or regulators,
meteorologists have no recognizable duties to understand parties’ interests
and arguments, and no worries about potential tensions between doing justice
in a particular case and setting optimal precedent for future cases. The case
for discretion among human decisionmakers—and, by extension, in the forms
of legal practice deployed by those advocating before them—is far stronger
in law than it is in meteorology.
Flexibility is especially important for agencies regulating fast-moving
229
fields. It will, of necessity, “break” both the brute force prediction models
and the expert systems models of devotees of artificial intelligence in law.
That is a feature, not a bug, of judicial and agency discretion. Many past
particular problem to warrant rigidifying its tentative judgment into a hard and fast rule. Or
the problem may be so specialized and varying in nature as to be impossible of capture within
the boundaries of a general rule. In those situations, the agency must retain power to deal
with the problems on a case-to-case basis if the administrative process is to be effective.
There is thus a very definite place for the case-by-case evolution of statutory standards. And
the choice made between proceeding by general rule or by individual, ad hoc litigation is one
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efforts to rationalize and algorithmatize the law have failed, for good reason:
there is no way to fairly extrapolate the thought processes of some body of
past decisionmaking to all new scenarios. For example, the introduction of a
“grid” of pre-programmed factors in social security disability determinations
was originally seen as a prelude to automation of such decisions.230 But very
quickly forms of discretion started entering into the grid, to do justice to the
infinite variety of factual scenarios presented by sick and disabled
claimants.231
This is not to discount entirely the deployment of artificial
intelligence in law. Brute force predictors may help advise clients as
crystalline rules turn into muddy standards, and vice versa. 232 They can also
alert decisionmakers when biases begin to emerge.233 For example, a notable
study in behavioral economics recently exposed judges imposing shorter
sentences after lunch than before it.234 Ideally, such studies do not inspire
predictive analytics firms like Lex Machina to find other extraneous
influences on decisionmaking and to advise clients on how to take advantage
of them (by, for example, sending tall attorneys to advocate before judges
revealed to be partial to tall advocates). Rather, this disturbing finding is
better framed as a prompt to judges to start developing ways of guarding
230
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against this hunger bias once they’re alerted to it (or, failing that, to snack
regularly).235 Other professionals (like physicians and pharmacists) routinely
utilize automated alarms as “guard rails” to warn against potentially wrong
decisions.236 Such decision support tools are not a replacement of the human
with the algorithmic, but rather another step toward improving a sociotechnical system of human decisionmakers and machine-aided decision
analysis.237
CONCLUSION
The automation of a field as complex as law can lead to perverse
consequences. Billed as a way of streamlining legal services, artificial
intelligence can easily distort or subvert the purposes it is billed as
supporting. Standardized legal forms may betray the objectives of the
customer they ostensibly serve. Software can radically simplify compliance
efforts, but when it does so by downplaying, trivializing, or ignoring
important aspects of the language of law, it is a betrayal of the rule of law—
not its translation into code.
Despite all these problems, many of which remain either unresolved
or inadequately addressed, legal futurists continue to promote the
acceleration of automation in law.238 As clients, bar associations, and
legislators debate how far to permit software to substitute for legal counsel
and advocacy, they should keep several themes of this article in mind.
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Both humble and ambitious versions of substitutive legal automation
have stalled, or failed to fully realize their announced ambitions.239 The legal
profession should pursue an alternative paradigm—a complementary vision
of human-machine cooperation. Known as intelligence augmentation, this
pragmatic approach motivated far more advances in computing over the past
half-century than dreams of general artificial intelligence.240 Complementary
automation enables human attorneys, and other workers in the legal
profession, to do justice to the complexity and subtlety of language.
Those working in the field of legal technology should be careful to
avoid conflating attorneys’ professional role with the delivery of expertise.
The rule of law entails a system of social relationships and legitimate
governance, not simply the transfer and evaluation of information about
behavior. There is necessarily some degree of self-governance among
professionals, which gives them an occupational identity distinct from other
workers. Their primary fiduciary duty is to clients, not managers or
shareholders. The main reason they enjoy this autonomy is because they must
handle intractable conflicts of values that repeatedly require thoughtful
discretion and negotiation. A robust and ethical legal profession respects that
discretion, founded on the flexibility and subtlety of legal language, as a
prerequisite for a just and accountable social order. It ensures a rule of
persons, not machines.
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presidential election showed the pervasiveness of the problem. See, e.g., Frank Pasquale,
The Automated Public Sphere, in THE POLITICS AND POLICIES OF BIG DATA: BIG DATA,
BIG BROTHER? (Ann Rudinow Sætnan, Ingrid Schneider & Nicola Green eds., 2018)
(describing the pervasiveness and effect of fake news in automated environments)
240
JOHN MARKOFF, MACHINES OF LOVING GRACE 1-20 (2015) (describing history of
computer science research); accord, DANIEL CREVIER, AI: THE TUMULTUOUS HISTORY OF
THE SEARCH FOR ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 209 (1993) (describing the AI winter of the
1980s and the failures of substitutive expert systems).
239

60

